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Fixed costs involved in crop pattern changes and agri-environmental schemes  
 
Abstract 
Agri-environmental schemes are the main policy instrument currently available in the 
European Union to promote environmentally friendly farming practices. Nevertheless, 
the adoption rate of these measures is still limited. This paper develops a profit 
maximizer theoretical framework to explain the farmer’s sign-up decision and the area 
to put under an agri-environmental measure characterised by a change in the crop 
pattern. The application concerns an agri-environmental measure awarding the 
introduction of alfalfa in cereal farms in Natura 2000 designated areas of Aragon 
(Spain). The econometric specification accounts for both the upper censoring of the 
enrolled area, constrained by the available eligible area, and the self-selection of 
contractors according to the extra-profit of their enrolment. To test the absence of fixed 
costs of enrolment, a simple tobit with a lower and an upper bound, that corresponds to 
the non fixed costs situation, is compared to the censored model with selection. 
Estimated specifications based on the enrolled area do not provided normally distributed 
residues and are not suitable to carry out the likelihood ratio test. Estimated 
specifications based on the share of enrolled area in the eligible area provide normally 
distributed residues. The likelihood ratio test rejects the absence of fixed costs. 
Technical factors as well as social capital variables are taken into consideration as 
determinants of technical and transaction costs. Estimation results show that there is an 
adoption barrier derived from the know-how affecting the fixed compliance costs of 
introducing the new crop. In addition, there is an adoption barrier derived from 
transaction costs which are reduced in the presence of social networks. These results 
suggest that a non linear payment mechanism or auctions might be suitable to ensure a 
better coverage of Natura 2000 eligible areas by the contracts, with a limited increase in 
related public expenditures.   
Keywords:  agri-environmental scheme, land use, fixed costs, transaction costs, 
qualitative and limited dependent variable model  
JEL classifications: Q12, Q15, Q52, Q57, Q58, H23, D23, D24, C24, C34, C51 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Revoir les primes agri-environnementales: l’impact des coûts fixes dans la 
participation aux programmes agri-environnementaux 
Résumé 
Les programmes agri-environnementaux constituent l’un des principaux instruments de 
promotion de pratiques agricoles favorables à l’environnement dans l’Union 
Européenne. Cependant, le taux d’adoption de ces mesures reste souvent limité. Ce 
papier vise à expliquer l’adoption d’une mesure modifiant l’assolement. Un modèle 
d’allocation de la surface de l’exploitation agricole, supposée fixe, est basé sur la 
maximisation de la somme des profits des différentes cultures, potentiellement affectés 
par des coûts fixes relativement à la surface cultivée. L’application empirique concerne 
l’introduction de luzerne dans des exploitations céréalières situées en zones Natura 2000 
en Aragon (Espagne). Le programme offre une prime de 102€ par hectare de surface 
céréalière convertie à la luzerne. La spécification économétrique, correspondant à une 
forme particulière de tobit généralisé, prend en compte simultanément la censure à 
droite de la surface contractualisée par la surface éligible de l’exploitation et l’auto-
sélection des contractants en fonction de la variation du profit total liée au contrat, qui 
constitue la deuxième variable dépendante. L’analyse micro-économique permet de 
montrer qu’en l’absence de coûts fixes liés à la contractualisation, la spécification 
économétrique se réduit à un tobit simple. La surface sous contrat est alors la seule 
variable à expliquer. Elle est toujours censurée à droite par la surface éligible, mais 
aussi à gauche en zéro. En l’absence de coûts fixes, la variable latente correspondant à 
la surface sous contrat est en effet redondante avec la variation du profit liée au contrat, 
dont elle est la duale pour une prime donnée. L’estimation des tobit simple et généralisé 
permet de tester simplement l’absence de coûts fixes liés à la contractualisation. 
Ensuite, la comparaison des déterminants de l’adoption d’une part et de la surface sous 
contrat d’autre part permet d’identifier partiellement la source et la nature de ces coûts 
fixes. Certains sont clairement liés à des investissements en savoir-faire lié à la luzerne, 
d’autres sont des coûts de transaction spécifiques à l’adoption du contrat. Les résultats 
suggèrent qu’un paiement non linéaire ou des mécanismes d’enchères permettraient de 
mieux couvrir les zones à enjeux sans trop accroître la dépense publique.  
Mots-clefs : mesures agri-environnementales, allocation de la terre, coûts fixes, coûts 
de transaction, modèle à variables qualitatives et à variables dépendantes limitées 
Classifications JEL : Q12, Q15, Q52, Q57, Q58, H23, D23, D24, C24, C34, C51 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Fixed costs involved in crop pattern changes and agri-environmental schemes  
 
1. Introduction 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are the main policy instrument currently available 
in the European Union (EU) to foster improvements in the relationship between 
agriculture and the environment. Over 35 million hectares were under some kind of 
AES in the EU-15 in 2003 with an overall 3.7billion € in public funds being allocated 
annually to this policy and an overall expenditure of 14 billion € of EAGGF funds 
during the 2000-2006 period (DG Agriculture, 2006). Payment levels for each AES are 
calculated based on supply side approaches, aiming at compensating forgone profits and 
additional costs (article 39-4, Regulation 1698/2005). Formerly, under Agenda 2000, a 
20% incentive was foreseen in some cases, this option has been removed for the current 
programming period although transaction costs, if necessary, can also be compensated 
for.  
Prior research has identified that premiums based on forgone profit might not be 
sufficient to ensure farmer participation. Cooper and Signorello (2008) show how risk-
related issues can require premiums to cover more than the mean loss in profit 
associated with adoption. They back their theoretical assumption estimating this 
additional payment comparing contingent valuation estimates of willingness to accept 
with actual forgone profits. Additionally Barreiro-Hurlé et al. (2008) have shown that 
the sign-up decision is not solely affected by farm technical characteristics, thus 
identifying the limited effect of premiums in fostering adoption, especially for low 
requirement measures. These results point at the fact that even the 20% incentive was 
not sufficient to foster AES sign-up, thus partially explaining the low enrolment rates 
detected throughout the EU for AES. While Austria, Finland and Luxembourg have 
more than two thirds of their national utilised agricultural area (UAA) involved in agri-
environmental measures, in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain the 
coverage is just a mere 5% of their total UAA (Glebe and Salhofer, 2007).  
This paper expands the understanding of the effect of supply side estimated premiums 
in AES participation, considering the potential effects of fixed costs associated with 
sign-up. Several studies have considered factors influencing farmers’ participation. 
They can be categorised in four main categories (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002), 
programme (type of measure, compensation paid, application costs, etc.) and market Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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(food and environment demand) characteristics constitute the so-called extrinsic factors 
while farm (size, crop portfolio, etc.) and individual farmer (age, education, etc.) 
characteristics are intrinsic factors. Fixed costs related to adoption would be related to 
costs that do not vary with the amount of area enrolled and are mainly related with 
investments (both assets and know-how) needed to implement AES. An additional 
source of fixed costs can be transaction costs (TC), which are increasing with asset 
specificity. Assets are specific when they are sunk, i.e., not profitable in another 
transaction. Therefore actions and warrants needed to secure the transaction entail TC 
which themselves are sunk. There is empirical evidence that AES requiring higher 
specific assets involve higher TC, and that some TC do not depend on the enrolled area: 
they are fixed costs (Ducos and Dupraz, 2007). Logically, such fixed TC should 
accompany fixed costs of specific assets. One special case of these costs is related to 
AES promoting a change in the crop pattern. Fixed costs are also related to variable 
costs and benefits because higher investment or specialization of the farmer implies 
higher land profitability, inducing a higher loss when the crop is removed. This paper 
tests whether fixed costs do exist for AES implementation. The empirical study also 
examines what types of fixed costs are significant. Are they related to TC only? Are 
they generated by specific investments? The results therefore provide evidence on 
whether the current approach to set premiums levels is adequate to foster adoption of 
this type of schemes.  
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the conceptual framework with the 
theoretical model adapted to test the research hypothesis. Section 3 includes a 
description of the AES selected for corroborating the theoretical hypothesis as well as 
the field work undertaken and the estimated econometric model. Next, section 4 
presents the model estimation results and section 5 provides a summary of the main 
findings and the policy recommendations derived from them. 
 
2. Conceptual  framework 
Profit maximising farmers face the option to sign-up or not an AES contract. AES 
adoption is thus based on an increase in land profitability derived from a change in 
practices or land allocation. A simplified two activity model is developed, where 
activity c is the current land use and activity a the alternative land use that will be 
subsidized by the AES. The farm profit structure is defined as to consider the effects of Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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fixed costs associated either with current or alternative land management, and 
transaction costs associated with AES implementation. In this static model, we assume 
that fixed costs are sunk costs, considering that the costs of the physical assets, that can 
be resold or rented on the market, are adjusted on a per-hectare basis and integrated into 
the variable profit function. So the fixed costs which are specific to each land use 
typically include specific knowledge costs, part of the costs of specific equipment or 
land improvement that cannot be recovered on the second hand markets or rented at fair 
prices.  
 
2.1.  Costs and benefits with and without an AES contract 
Before the AES introduction, the land allocation model is based on the profit 
maximising program [1]. Farmers’ face a surface restriction in which the total eligible 
area (ST) is allocated between the two competing options, current production (Sc), and 
the alternative production (Sa). All areas are positive, implying that the area of any land 
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Profit is split into two components: the first one (C1) is associated with current 
production and the second one (C2) with the alternative production. For each land use i, 
specific fixed costs (FCi) are considered. Fixed costs are assumed to be totally 
explained by the fixed factors endowments of the farm (Z
T). They are different from 
zero only if the area devoted to the related production is strictly positive. In this case, 
their amount does not depend on this area. Each production variable profit (
i  ) 
depends on the variable input-output prices (pi), on the area under cultivation (Si) and on 
fixed factors endowments (Z
T). Individual variable profit functions are assumed to be 
increasing and quasi concave with respect to the area allocated to the corresponding 
land use. The profit in the initial situation is the solution of program [1], denoted 
) (
*
a S  . Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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To gain understanding of the effect of fixed costs on sign-up decision, two initial 
situations are considered: one where land use a existed before AES implementation and 
one where it did not. The situation where the land use a already covers the whole 
eligible area should not be relevant as the AES aims at promoting this land use.  
If land use a already covered a part of the farm, the land allocation equilibrium before 
AES implementation implies that fixed costs are covered for both crops and that 
marginal returns are equal. Equation [2] comes from the first order condition of 
programme [1], where Sa
* is the optimal area for land use a. It is necessary that the 
marginal profit (
i
s  ) of one of the land uses decreases with its area for the existence of 
such an interior solution.  
 






s S S S      
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In the other initial situation, there is no area for land use a that provides a higher profit 
than land use c, which is summarized by expression [3].  
 





c S FC S FC S S FC S   [3] 
 
With the introduction of the AES, the profit maximisation program [4] includes a third 
component (C3), in addition to the two components of program [1]. It is made of the 
AES payment ( a S  ), assuming a constant per-hectare payment, minus the fixed and 
variable TC associated to the AES contract, respectively denoted FTC and VTC. 
Variable transaction costs (VTC) are assumed to be increasing and quasi-convex when 
the area of the alternative crop increases. These TC potentially depend on fixed factors 
endowments (Z
T). They also depend on social capital variables (Z
SC) which distinguish 
them from technical costs and benefits.  
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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If land use a already covered a part of the farm, the AES contract is adopted and it 
displaces the initial equilibrium (equation [2]) to S
* AES  if the change in variable profit 
(P) due to the contract covers the AES related fixed transaction costs FTC. Other fixed 
costs, associated with each crop technology, remain unchanged in the new allocation of 
land, because both crops were already grown before contracting. The marginal profits 
for land use a and c reach a new equilibrium according to the AES premium and the 
marginal transaction cost function (VTCs). If the premium is high enough to exceed the 
difference in marginal profits for the whole eligible area, the enrolled area covered by 
crop a is constrained by this eligible area. Relation [5] provides the characteristics of the 
solutions of programme [4] when the AES contract is adopted. If the change in variable 
profit (P) does not exceed the fixed transaction costs FTC, the contract is not accepted 
and equations [2] still hold. The fixed technology costs (FCi) do not matter since they 
were already covered by the variable profit in the initial situation.    
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If land use a  was not present on the farm before AES implementation, the fixed 
technology costs of the crop a matter. The contract is signed-up if the change in variable 
profit (P) due to the contract covers both the fixed transaction costs FTC and the fixed 
technology costs FCa (relationship [6]). Again, the total eligible area may restrict the 
enrolled area, with a premium exceeding the difference in marginal profits between 
current and alternative crop for this area. Otherwise the premium equals the difference 
in marginal profits for the optimal enrolled area.  Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Fixed costs related to the land use c are not taken into account, because they do not 
change with the reduction of this land use area. Even if the land use c completely 
disappears because of the AES contract, the related fixed costs are not recovered as we 
assume they are sunk. 
Graph 1 illustrates the change in variable profit (P) due to the contract, when the crop a 
is initially absent. VTCs are supposed to be negligible. Fixed costs are not represented. 
Decreasing marginal profits are represented. From the left to the right, the marginal 
profit of crop a  decreases as its area increases while the marginal profit of crop c 
increases as its area decreases. Three possible outcomes are illustrated on Graph 1: 
1.  The change in the variable profit due to the contract (P represented by the area 
ABC on the graph) is not high enough to cover the fixed costs for the optimal enrolled 
area with a contract corresponding to A. So the contract is not signed.  
2.  The change in the variable profit (P represented by the area DBE on the graph) 
is high enough to cover the fixed costs for the optimal enrolled area (S
*AES) with a 
contract corresponding to D. So the contract is signed. This is an internal equilibrium, 
where the premium is equal to the difference in the marginal profits between the two 
land allocations. 
3.  The premium is higher than the marginal profit difference and P is higher than 
the additional fixed costs. In this case the enrolled area is limited by the eligible area. 
The unrestricted profit maximising enrolled area would be higher than the eligible area.  Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Source: Own elaboration 
 
The graph does not represent every possible individual situation of the farmers facing 
the AES contract. On the one hand, the contract may be refused even if the unrestricted 
enrolled area exceeds the eligible area. It happens when the change in the variable profit 
P for the enrolled area equalling the eligible area does not cover the additional fixed 
costs due to the contract. On the other hand, the contract may be refused when there are 
no fixed costs at all. It happens if the premium does not cover the difference in the 
marginal profits of crop c and a for any positive enrolled area. It means that the 
unrestricted optimal enrolled area would be negative. The existence of fixed costs and 
the type of fixed costs are empirical issues. In order to reveal non negligible fixed costs, 
it is necessary to consider the econometric specifications with and without fixed costs.  
 
2.2.  Modelling the farmer’s decision with and without fixed costs 
The empirical analysis is based on the preceding theoretical results. Accordingly, we 
assume that the observed enrolled area is the optimal enrolled area (S*
AES) for each 
farm. A strictly positive enrolled area is observed when the profit with the contract 
exceeds the profit without the contract. As the profit with the contract depends on the 
 
 2 AES
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optimal enrolled area, we first consider the notional enrolled area (S*) that is not 
bounded by zero or the eligible area. S* is the solution of program [4] without the area 
restrictions ( T a S S   0 ) and always verifies the first order condition [7].  
   




s          [7] 
 
S* does not depend on fixed costs. It only depends on the marginal cost and profit 
curves and on the AES premium. Referring to equation [4], S* depends on the prices of 
current and alternative crops and on the farm and farmer characteristics (Z
T, Z
SC). 
If there are no fixed costs, the value of the notional area S* both determine the decision 
to sign the contract and the enrolled area S*
NF according to the decision rules [8]. If the 
notional area is negative, meaning that the premium does not compensate the difference 
in marginal profits for any strictly positive enrolled area, the contract is not signed and 
the enrolled area is zero. If the notional area exceeds the eligible area ST, the enrolled 
area equals the eligible area. In between, the enrolled area equals the notional area.   
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When fixed costs are not negligible, the participation in AES depends on the difference 
in total profits with and without contract. A strictly positive enrolled area is observed 
when this difference is strictly positive only. The profit without contract is simply the 
profit of the initial situation () (
*
a S  ). The profit with contract is the profit obtained with 
the optimal area S*
NF, denoted  ) * (
NF S   in relationship [9]. Indeed, the optimal area 
does not depend on fixed costs and the relationship [8] still holds, however the total 
profit assuming that the contract is signed-up  ) * (
NF S   includes fixed costs.   
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The difference in total profits with and without contract is denoted  ) * , (
* NF
a S S D . It 
depends on the initial situation as explained in the preceding section. If the alternative 
land use already existed before the AES introduction, the related fixed costs (FCa) are 
already covered by the variable profit; if it did not, the fixed costs have to be covered by 
the change in variable profit derived from the contract (equations [10]). 
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Equations [10] confirm that the difference in profits can never be strictly positive when 
S*
NF equals zero, because Sa
* maximises the profit without contract. They also show 
that the contract might not be profitable because of fixed costs, despite a strictly positive 
S*
NF in contrast with the situation without fixed costs. A strictly positive enrolled area is 
observed if and only if the contract is profitable, meaning that the variable profit (P) 
covers the fixed costs (relationships [3] and [4]). There are two sub-cases: the enrolled 
area reached the eligible area and the enrolled area equals the notional area. With fixed 
costs, the decision rules are provided by equations [11]. The enrolled area 
simultaneously depend on the notional area S* defined by [7] and on the difference in 
total profits, in contrast with [8]. The notional area S* does not depend on the eligible 
area, while  ) * , (
* NF
a S S D  does because of S*
NF. Other exogenous determinants are 
prices, AES premium and fixed characteristics of farm and farmers as in [8].  
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If the difference in total profits is negative, the contract is not adopted and the enrolled 
area S*
AES is zero whichever the values of S* and S*
NF. In particular the notional area S* 
may reach the eligible area ST without providing a change in the variable profit that is 
large enough to cover the fixed costs. Moreover, the smaller the eligible area is, the 
lower the probability that the change in total profits is positive, if all other determinants 
are the same. For a strictly positive difference in total profits, there are two possible 
results: the notional area is always strictly positive but may or may not reach the eligible 
area.  
A last analytical result is important for the empirical analysis. If the fixed costs FTC and 
FCa both equal zero, the decision rules [8] and [11] are equivalent. In this case S*
NF is 
the solution of program [4]. This means that a strictly positive notional area S* implies a 
strictly positive  ) * , (
* NF
a S S D .  
 
2.3.  Econometric specifications with and without fixed costs 
Limited and qualitative dependent variable econometrics enable the estimation of the 
dependent variables D and S* according to their exogenous determinants 
) , , , , , (
SC T
a c T Z Z p p S  , as far as a sample of AES participants and non participants is 
available. The observed variables are the dummy variable Y, that indicates AES 
participation, and the observed enrolled area S which is the profit maximising enrolled 
area (
AES S
* ). Referring to [11], the two observed dependent variables respectively 
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We assume that the latent variable pair (D, S*) is distributed according to a binomial 
normal cumulative function. The deterministic part is a linear function of the 
explanatory variables of vector X that gathers a constant term and the observed 
determinants ) , , , , , (
SC T
a c T Z Z p p S  . The subscript j refers to the observation j for each 
variable while Greek letters are the parameters to be estimated. The observations are 
assumed independently and identically distributed. The sample likelihood is calculated 
with  the cumulative function of the reduced and centred normal distribution,  2   the 
cumulative function of the reduced and centred binomial normal distribution and  2   the 
corresponding joint density function of the binomial normal distribution. Referring to 
[12], there are three types of observations: non participants, participants whose enrolled 
area reaches the eligible area, and participants with an enrolled area that does not reach 
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The parameters  


 , ,     and   are then estimated by the maximum likelihood 
estimator. As the latent variable D is not observed, apart from its sign, the parameter   Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
 
  15
cannot be identified. It is normalised to 1. This econometric specification of S 
corresponds to a generalised tobit in which strictly positive values of S are selected by 
Y, with a right censoring of S by ST.  
When the fixed costs FTC and FCa both equal zero, we noticed that the decision rules 
[8] and [11] are equivalent. As a consequence, the variable D is redundant with S* and Y 
is redundant with S which is censored by zero on the left and censored by ST on the 
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The sample likelihood is calculated with  the cumulative function of the reduced and 
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If fixed costs are negligible, the results of the generalised tobit [13] and the results of 
the simple tobit [15] must be the same as far as the same explanatory variables (X) are 
used in both estimations. Significantly different results would contradict the hypothesis 
of negligible fixed costs. The negligible fixed costs hypothesis is equivalent to the 
restriction ( ,  )=( , 1), which can be tested by the likelihood ratio test. If Ls and Ps 
respectively denote the likelihood and the number of parameters of the simple tobit [15] Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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and if Lg and Pg respectively denote the likelihood and the number of parameters of the 
generalised tobit [13], the statistic T=2[log(Lg)-log(Ls)] follows a Chi-square 
distribution with (Pg-Ps) degrees of freedom.  
 
3. Case  study 
A survey of eligible farmers for an alternative crop AES has been carried out. This AES 
measure
1 requires rain-fed land allocation to alfalfa against a per-hectare payment of 
102€. The farmers are free to decide how much land they enrol. The contractors are the 
farmers who enrolled some land into the measure and the non contractors are the 
farmers who did not. Both types of farmers were surveyed. The replacement of cereal 
crops by alfalfa is expected to have positive effects on the biologic diversity in the 
targeted Natura 2000 areas where eligible land has been designated. The AES eligible 
land is the non permanent rain fed crop land. This measure can be considered as a high-
asset specificity measure due to the change in the crop pattern, requiring additional 
know-how and an opportunity cost due to the loss of cereal output when alfalfa harvest 
is not ensured due to weather variability. Fieldwork has been undertaken in three 
counties in Aragón (Northern Spain). There were 107 contractors only, resulting in an 
uptake rate of 2.8%. So the sample was discretionally allocated to over-represent 
contractors (40% of the questionnaires were addressed to contractors). The total sample 
contains 157 farmers among which 62 enrolled land into the scheme
2. The 94 non 
contractors were randomly selected from the different municipalities according to their 
overall percentage of eligible farmers. The survey revealed that 53 non contractors were 
not aware of the AES and had not considered their opportunity of applying for an AES 
contract. As a consequence, these 53 observations were removed from our analysis. 
Indeed we assume rather well informed farmers who are able to calculate their profit 
with and without contract. One contractor was also removed because of inconsistent and 
missing answers to the questionnaire. The usable sample is reduced to 103 farmers with 
61 contractors and 42 non contractors. Eligible and enrolled areas in this sample are 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the measure requirements can be found in BOA (2005).  
2 Differences between total sign-ups (107) and interviewed farmers (62) are due to same farm-holding 
applying for more than one contract (two cases), contact data not facilitated by the managing authority 
(36 cases) or farmer not willing to participate in the survey (seven cases).  Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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described in Table 1. The eligible area does not differ significantly between contractors 
and non contractors. The average enrolled area of contractors is 21 hectares, and reaches 
a maximum of 100 hectares for three of them. Ten farmers enrolled their whole eligible 
area. According to our model we assume they would have enrolled a larger area if 
possible.  
 
Table 1: Eligible and enrolled area in the sample 







103 farmers  average  74.44 12.68  26
 max  562.00 100.00  100
 min  0.09 0.00  0






61 farmers  average  77.70 21.42  45
 max  562.00 100.00  100
 min  3.50 3.00  4
 
The questionnaire used was designed by the research team after a thorough review of 
previous research, agricultural structure in the area and interviews with the AES 
managing authority. An initial version was field tested with 5 farmers for 
comprehension before generating the final version. The survey was conducted during 
the period April-June 2007 by a market research company, which employed 
interviewers with agronomic background and trained in situ by the research team. The 
final version of the questionnaire gathered data regarding three main topics: a) farm 
basic data, b) information channels, knowledge and networks of the farmer and c) AES 
eligible and enrolled areas
3.  
                                                 
3 The questionnaire is available upon request to the authors.  Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Table 2 presents the variables used to measure the different concepts put forward in the 
microeconomic model, the economic values of farmers’ behaviour they are supposed to 
affect and their expected sign on the adoption decision. Table 3 presents the differences 
in the frequencies of these variables between contractors and non contractors and the 
related independence Chi2 tests. Contractors have more frequently livestock on their 
farms and grew more frequently dry alfalfa before the AES introduction, while non 
contractors are more frequently specialised in dry cereal crops and owners of harvesters. 
At this stage, the other variables do not discriminate contractors and non contractors 
significantly.  
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Table 2: Selected explanatory variables, affected values and expected impact on 
AES sign-up 





eliarea  Eligible area (number of ha)  a   and FCa  + 
spedrycer 
Non-irrigated cereal specialization farmer (1 
if yes)
4 
c    - 
irrcereal 
Crop distribution includes irrigated cereal (1 
if yes) 
c    - 
harvester  Farm owns harvester (1 if yes)  c    - 
dryalfalfa 
Farm already had alfalfa before AES (1 if 
yes) 
FCa  + 
irralfalfa 
Crop distribution includes irrigated alfalfa (1 
if yes) 




Presence of livestock on the farm-holding (1 
if yes) 
a  and  FCa  + 
cooperative 
Farmer is a member of a cooperative for 
agri-input provision (1 if yes) 
c  ,
a  , FTC, 
VTC 
- and + 
formation 
Farmer attended agricultural formation 
courses during the last five years (1 if yes) 
c  ,




Farmer obtains information related to AES 
from financial entities (1 if yes) 




Farmer uses more than one source for 
technical advice (1 if yes) 
FTC, VTC  + 
 
                                                 
4 This variable is constructed assuming specialization implies the farm has a non-irrigated cereal area 
above the mean of farms with this land use (58 ha). Results are robust with regards to alternative 
specialization measures (i.e. area above the third quartile). Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Table 3: Selected explanatory variables, differences between contractors and non 
contractors 
 Variable  Contractors  Non  contractors  p-value of Chi-2 test 
eliarea  77.7 ha  69.7 ha  0.5059 
spedrycer  21% 48%  0.0049 
irrcereal  26% 50%  0.0135 
harvester  3% 19%  0.0079 
dryalfalfa  54% 21%  0.0009 
irralfalfa  34% 34%  0.7126 
Z
T 
livestock  67% 33%  0.0007 
cooperative  69% 76%  0.4158 
formation  57% 48%  0.3293 
infaesfinen  13% 5%  0.1594 
Z
SC 




The first step of the econometric analysis is the choice of the econometric specification. 
We estimated the generalised tobit with sample selection of contractors and a right 
censoring of the enrolled area corresponding to the likelihood given by [13]. The 
maximum likelihood estimator was computerised with the QLIM procedure of the SAS 
software. Estimations with two alternative specifications have been carried out. In the 
first one, the dependent variables are the dummy indicating the AES enrolment and the 
enrolled area, which is censored upward by the eligible area. In the second one, the 
dependent variables are the dummy indicating the AES enrolment and the share of the 
enrolled area in the eligible area, which is censored upward by 1. This second 
specification, using the share of the enrolled area in the eligible area as a dependent 
variable, is simply described by the relationships [12] to [15] where  * j S   is replaced by Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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T j S S / *,   j S  by  T j S S /  and  T S  by 1. As the variable addinfsource is never significant, 
results are presented without it. Both specifications bring similar results regarding the 
explanatory variable effects in the generalised tobit estimation (Annex 1).  However the 
assumption of a normal distribution of the enrolled area residues is rejected according to 
the Kolmogorof-Smirnoff or other goodness of fit tests, while it is not rejected when the 
share of the enrolled area in the eligible area is the dependent variable (see Annex 2).  
As a consequence, we use the second specification to carry out the likelihood ratio test. 
It is based on the results of the generalised tobit and of the simple tobit displayed in 
Table 4. 
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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Table 4: Comparison of the generalised tobit with the simple tobit results 
  Generalised tobit  Simple tobit 
  Sign-up decision (D)  Enrolled share T j S S / *  Enrolled  share T j S S / *  
Variable  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Constant -0.317907  0.4123  0.973348 <.0001  0.330890  0.0246 
eliarea  0.003420 0.1967 -0.001041 0.0242  -0.00040872 0.9538 
spedrycer  -1.197449 0.0106 -0.247214  0.0294  -0.506200  0.0011 
irrcereal  -0.745894 0.0330 -0.003561 0.9709  -0.263519 0.0412 
harvester  -2.059304 0.0207 0.416439  0.0853  -0.504553  0.0577 
dryalfalfa  1.008649 0.0034 -0.054474 0.5705  0.219032 0.0660 
irralfalfa  0.592349 0.1078 0.216379 0.0128  0.297798  0.0170 
livestock  0.690225 0.0349 -0.286717  0.0047  0.029561 0.8072 
cooperative  -0.477363 0.2037 -0.203472 0.0220  -0.299589  0.0217 
formation  0.759415 0.0345 -0.096700 0.2853  0.098844  0.4046 
infaesfinen  1.753722 0.0133 -0.149401 0.2696  0.225690  0.2391 
   -0.171851 0.7660         




N = 103 
Selected enrolled share observations: 61 
 
 
Right censored observations: 10 (upper bound=1) 
 
log likelihood: log(Lg) = -59.57950 
number of parameters: Pg = 24 
N = 103 
Left censored observations: 42 (lower 
bound=0) 
 
Right censored observation: 10 (upper 
bound=1) 
log likelihood: log(Ls )= -71.63323 
number of parameters: Ps = 12 
 
The statistic T=2[log(Lg)-log(Ls)] equals 24.10746.  
The 5% Chi-square critical value for (Pg-Ps)=12 degrees of freedom is 21.02607. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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So, the probability that the hypothesis ( ,   )=( , 1) is true is lower than 5% 
according to our data set. As a consequence, we can reject the hypothesis of negligible 
fixed costs.  
The comparison of sign-up decision and enrolled share determinants in the generalised 
tobit helps to identify the determinants of fixed costs and the determinants of variable 
costs. The variables which are significant for the sign-up decision and do not influence 
the enrolled area affect more the fixed costs than the variable costs of contracting. 
Namely dryalfalfa, formation and infaesfinen clearly decrease fixed costs of contracting 
while irrcereal increases such costs. As infaesfinen is assumed to affect transaction 
costs only, its significant effect shows that some fixed costs are transaction costs. Some 
variables affect the share of enrolled area and the sign-up decision accordingly. It means 
that they have an effect on the variable costs of contracting. spedrycer and cooperative 
negatively affect the area under contract, probably because they positively affect the 
cereal variable profit. Accordingly, spedrycer discourages the sign-up decision; 
cooperative also does but not significantly. We cannot conclude from these results 
whether spedrycer or cooperative affect fixed costs. In contrast, irralfalfa positively 
affects the area under contract, probably because it positively affects the alfalfa variable 
profit. Accordingly, irralfalfa almost significantly favours the sign-up decision. We 
cannot conclude from these results whether irralfalfa affects fixed costs.    
The cases of livestock and harvester deserve further discussion, because they have 
opposite effects on the sign-up decision and on the enrolled share. Clearly, farmers with 
livestock have lower fixed costs associated with the introduction of alfalfa, however 
their marginal profit of enrolled land decreases faster than for farmers without livestock: 
undertaking a comparative analysis between farmers with and without livestock shows 
that farmers with livestock have smaller holdings and, correspondingly less eligible 
surface. harvester discourages AES uptake. According to our model, this is explained 
by a positive effect of harvester on the cereal marginal profit, for instance by realising 
size economies as farms owing their harvester are the largest ones. The positive effect 
of harvester on the enrolled share is more difficult to understand. Referring to Annex 1, 
we can see that harvester seems to have the expected negative effect on the enrolled 
area. So, its positive effect on the share of the enrolled area in the eligible area might be 
explained by the interplay of the eligible area, which is larger for farms with harvester, 
and the economies of size due to the harvester that are larger for largest farms with Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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largest eligible areas than for relatively smaller farms with harvester that accordingly 
enrol a larger share of their eligible land. 
Some information regarding the nature of the fixed costs associated with this AES can 
be obtained from a detailed analysis of individual variables. Social capital variables, 
which are significant for the adoption and are not for the enrolled area, would reflect 
that fixed costs are not only technical in nature but include transaction costs. Moreover 
technical variables describing the presence of irrigated cereal impede adoption, while 
the presence of alfalfa before the scheme favours adoption and it does not influence on 
the area enrolled, therefore identifying the crop management know-how as a potential 
source of fixed costs. 
 
5.  Summary and policy implications 
The results support that the adoption decision for the selected AES is influenced by the 
existence of fixed costs related to AES participation. Fixed costs in this case are 
explained both by technical and social capital variables, involving both technical and 
transaction costs. Only a part of fixed costs are purely related to the agri-environmental 
scheme mechanism that requires information transfer and processing as well as 
administrative work. So the agri-environmental scheme is the opportunity to reveal the 
fixed costs associated to the introduction of a new crop, by studying the behaviour of 
eligible farmers. These results are obtained with an econometric specification that is 
fully in line with the microeconomic analysis of the farmland allocation. The estimated 
model simultaneously accounts for both the upper censoring of the enrolled area, 
constrained by the available eligible area, and the self-selection of contractors according 
to the extra profit of their enrolment. 
Factors defining the marginal profitability of land affects the adoption decision, 
influencing negatively adoption when cereal crop is considered and positively under the 
alternative crop, alfalfa. Specialized cereal growers with higher marginal profitability of 
land due to an investment in fixed costs (like the harvester) or the presence of irrigated 
cereal are less willing to apply for the AES as it is less profitable to change the crop 
pattern. On the other hand farmers with livestock that can graze on the alfalfa and 
therefore obtain a profit or farmers with the presence of irrigated alfalfa on their farm 
and with an easier access to inputs are more willing to participate. Sources of fixed Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°09-15 
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costs are identified by variables influencing the decision to enrol adoption without 
affecting the enrolled area. Technical fixed costs are related to the know-how 
management of the new crop, represented by the previous cultivation of this crop. Fixed 
costs are also influenced by social capital variables (formation and farmers well 
connected to financial entities). These variables do not affect marginal profits of any of 
the crops, directly. Accordingly they reveal the existence of fixed transaction costs.  
Reported results are in line with those by Ducos and Dupraz (2007) which identify the 
constraints involved by specific investments regarding the AES compliance costs. In 
our case, more technically demanding measures such as those which imply a change in 
the crop pattern seem to highlight the role of fixed technical costs, making such 
measures less profitable and adopted than measures where only marginal costs are at 
stake.  
If new AES promoted under the rural development plan for 2007-2013 in the EU want 
to follow a “deep and narrow” approach (i.e. very specific measures with demanding 
crop and management changes) current legislative framework can be a barrier for 
success. Compensating for transaction costs might not suffice to ensure enrolment, as 
fixed technical costs can be independent of transaction costs and curtail sign-up through 
a negative effect on marginal profitability. Moreover, other strategies to increase 
adoption, such as promotion of social networks to ensure more efficient information 
dissemination and reduction in transaction costs, albeit necessary, would not solve this 
problem if technical fixed costs are relevant. 
The use of market-based mechanism, such as contract auctions (Latacz-Lohman and 
Van der Hamsvoort, 1997) could overcome this deficiency as bids posted by farmers 
would be covering all cost concepts related to AES implementation. For standard 
contracts, non linear payments, associating a lump sum payment and a per hectare 
payment for instance, may increase participation and enrolled areas without increasing 
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Annex 1: Maximum likelihood estimations of the generalised tobit [13] for the 
dependent variables “enrolled area” (enrolledarea) and “share of enrolled area in 
the eligible area” (enrollshare) respectively 
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Annex 2: Tests for normal distribution of the residues estimated by the generalised 
tobit [13] for the dependent variables “enrolled area” (enrolledarea) and “share of 
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